The Challenge of High Unemployment by Alan S. Blinder
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE CHALLENGE OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT
Alan S. Blinder
Working Paper No. 2489




The Richard 1. Ely lecture presented at the meetings of the American Economic
Association, Chicago, December 28, 1987 and to be published in the May 1988 issue
of the American Economic Review.I am gratefulto Will Baumol, Ben Bernanke, Avinash
Dixit, Bob Eisner, Steve Goldfeld, Bob Gordon, Dan Hamermesh, David Romer, Harvey
Rosen, Bob Solow, and Larry Summers. The research reported here is part of the NBER's
research program in Economic Fluctuations. Any opinions expressed are those of the
author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Support from the
Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.NBER Working Paper #2489
January 1988
The Challenge of High Unemployment
ABSTRACT
It is argued that policymakers, macroeconomists and microeconomists
should all take high unemployment more seriously. The shortcomings of
existing theories of unemployment are discussed, and a new definition of
involuntary unemployment is proposed. A model is sketched in which falling
aggregate demand leads to "Keynesian" unemployment because labor is
heterogeneous and relative wages matter. Microeconomic theory is criticized
for assuming away unemployment and, in the process, radically changing the
answers to some basic questions in trade theory and public finance. Finally,
some speculative explanations are offered for the low unemployment now found




Princeton, NJ 08544The Ely lecture is an occasion to indulge in big think, to eschew
equations and "speak prose" ——arespite from the daily grind of vector
autoregressions, Euler equations, and phase diagrams. I intend to take full
advantage of this privilege tonight. Judging by past Ely lectures, it is also
an occasion either to celebrate the profession (or one's own contributions to
it) or to chide it. Some combination of flaws in my character and flaws in
our discipline incline me toward the latter.
My topic is the challenge of high unemployment, one which both
policymakers and economists have failed to meet. The challenge to
policymakers is to reduce unemployment. About this, I will be brief and to
the point. The challenge to economists is to explain high unemployment and
understand its implications for things economic. Here I will dwell longer.
I. THE CHALLENGE TO POLICYMAKERS
The failure to provide productive employment for all those willing and
able to work has long been one of the major weaknesses of market capitalism.
Since the mid 1970s, it has been shamefully debilitating. If one picture is
worth a thousand words, Figure 1 will help shorten the lecture. It shows
unemployment rates in the United States and the European OECD contries in two
different periods: 1961—1974 and 1975-1985. The contrast is stark.
The costs summarized in this graph are enormous for the U.S. and
colossal for Europe. And the corresponding Okun gaps, wide as they are,
understate the full costs. A high-pressure economy provides opportunities,
facilitates structural change, encourages inventiveness and innovation, opens
doors for society's underdogs, and yields a fiscal dividend that can be
spent, among other things, on public charity. All these promote the social
1cohesion and economic progress that make democratic mixed capitalism such a
wonderful system when it works well. A low-pressure economy slams the doors
shut, breeds a bunker mentality that resists change, stifles productivity
growth, and fosters both inequality and mean—spirited public policy. All this
makes reducing high unemployment a political, economic, and moral challenge
of the highest order.
To make the point in extreme form, think about the U.S. economy during
World War II, when unemployment virtually vanished, the economy flexed its
muscles, and America truly became a land of opportunity. Among the remarkable
features of this period was a 16% rise in real consumer spending between 1939
and 1944 despite the wholesale redirection of economic activity toward war
production. Now imagine that there was no war and all those soldiers and
equipment went abroad to work, not to fight, sending home no goods, just
remittances. But leave in your minds all the rationing and other nasty
Harberger triangles caused by the shortage economy. Ask yourself whether the
utility of the representative American would have been higher under these
hypothetical conditions or under the actual conditions of 1939 —-or,
abstracting from secular growth, even 1987 for that matter. My suggested
answer, you can tell, is yes.
A debater's point, you say, for wartime unemployment rates were absurdly
and unsustainably low. Probably so. But remember that just 14 years ago the
unemployment rates (using U.S. concepts) were 3.2% In the United Kingdom,
2.7% In France, and 0.7% in Germany. These are surely not unimaginable
worlds. And think of the social dividend that would be reaped if those
countries got unemployment even halfway back to where it was in 1973. Or
think about the present-day United States. While many people see today's 6%
national unemployment rate as "full employment," the unemployment rate is
2more like 3-4% in Massachusetts and New Jersey. Those two states and parts of
others do show clear signs of labor scarcity: Help-wanted signs are
everywhere and wages are rising faster than the national average. For all I
know, there may even be people whose marginal utility of leisure exceeds
their wage. But there are no signs of chaos, and shortages of goods and
services are rare. The local economies are, as a matter of fact, doing quite
well, thank you. Wouldn't it be nice if the whole country were in such good
shape? Aren't we wasting something precious if it could be?
Yet in the United States and, especially, in Europe, those in authority
often accept high unemployment with an air of resignation, as If it stemmed
from acts of nature rather than from acts of man. This is an attitude
conducive to paralysis; and so we wind up with an excess supply of excess
supply.
The European and American experiences differ both quantitatively and
qualitatively. While there is much we do not know about the details, the
broad outlines of the origins of high European unemployment are familiar
enough. Intransigent trade unions and well-intentioned but unintelligent
governments have erected a web of microeconomic barriers to full employment
that both make labor more expensive and transform wages from variable into
fixed costs. These include (with different weights in different countries)
high minimum wages, excessive severance pay, heavy fixed costs of employment,
restrictions on hiring and firing, support for the closed union shop,
meaningless licensing requirements, heavy—handed workplace rules, and
impediments to geographic mobility.' There is nothing at all "natural" about
unemployment that results from such misguided micro policies, and economists
rightly oppose them.
But there is also an important macro component to the slack we see in
3Europe today. And in the United States, which has avoided the horror stories
of European labor markets, restrictive policy is virtually the whole story
behind the Great Recession of the 1980s. Put plainly, governments here and
abroad have used high unemployment to exorcise the inflationary demon.
Unfortunately, economists are terribly divided on the relative
Importance of the micro and macro explanations for high unemployment. Some
think macro policy played a major role in the drama; others assign it only a
bit part. This internal schism, I am afraid, contributes to the policy
paralysis --whichbrings me to the role of economists, beginning with
macroeconomists.
II. THE CHALLENGE TO MACROECONOMISTS
Every science has its game playing and puzzle solving. It's harmless,
good clean fun, helps sharpen the mind, and occasionally turns up something
spectacularly useful. Economics is no exception, nor should It be. But I want
to suggest that contemporary academic economists have taken a good thing too
far, pushed the game—playing aspects beyond the region of even positive
marginal returns, and disengaged themselves from the practical policy
concerns that affect the lives of millions. We will not contribute much
toward alleviating unemployment while we fiddle around with theories of
Pareto—optimal recessions -—anavocation that might be called Nero-Classical
Economics.
It wasn't always that way. A century ago, Alfred Marshall concluded the
Inaugural lecture for his chair at Cambridge with these words:
It will be my most cherished ambition ...toincrease the numbers
of those whom Cambridge, the great mother of strong men, sends out
Into the world with cool heads but warm hearts, willing to give
some at least of their best powers to grappling with the social
suffering around them.2
4Even after translating the soppy Victorian prose into the modern vernacular,
Marshall's sentiments are frightfully out of touch with the realities of
contemporary academia, where a stubborn fixation on the real world is apt to
be considered boorish, if not downright anti-intellectual.
Yet is Marshall's ideal really foolishly romantic? Isn't it better than
Nero's? Didn't Keynes have a point when he longed for the day when economists
would be as useful as dentists? Greater concentration on real, rather than
imagined, problems need not make economics less scientific. Why, for example,
are so many scientists now working on AIDS and cancer? Yes, I know that part
of the answer is the one Willy Sutton gave when asked why he robbed banks:
That's where the money is. But another part of the answer is: That's where
the suffering is. It's a good answer, too.
Don't get me wrong. I am not suggesting that we all forsake mathematics
for social work. Being a do-gooder may not be the best way to do good; nor
should that be the sole concern of a scientist. Nor am I suggesting more
top—notch, policy—oriented research will banish the scourge of high
unemployment. Vested interests, Ideological cant, and sheer Ignorance surely
hold more sway over policy than does economic science. I am suggesting
something far more modest: that a major redirection of the work of hundreds
of economists might conceivably raise the quality of national economic policy
from, say, 3 to 4 on a scale of 10. Hell, Keynes did more than that by
himself.
As I see it, the challenge of unemployment to macroeconomists is
fourfold: to define Involuntary unemployment, to explain It theoretically, to
give the theory empirical content, and then to devise policies to reduce it.
5FIRST CHALLENGE: DEFINE IT
Some economists, you know, lean toward the tautological view that
anything done without literal compulsion must of necessity be voluntary.
Others detect elements of involuntarism whenever constraints become too
constraining. It may be that involuntary unemployment Is like pornography:
It's hard to define, but you know it when you see It.
Actually, defining involuntary unemployment is no trick at all in the
mythical case of homogeneous labor. If labor supplied exceeds labor demanded
at the going wage, the difference is literally and unambiguously involuntary.
This simplistic view of the world identifies involuntary unemployment with
wages that will not fall -—apoint to which I will return. But with
heterogeneous labor the simple definition no longer works, arid the whole
concept gets slippery. What wage do we mean? Which types of labor?
In the Keynesian oral tradition, the term "involuntary unemployment"
signifies two major ideas. The first is that there are Identifiably bad
times, called recessions or depressions, when the unemployment rate rises and
signs of economic distress are apparent. The second, and more controversial,
is that unemployment tends to be too high on average. Pursuing the analogy to
pornography, perhaps we should treat the term involuntary unemployment as
synonymous with "pornographic unemployment": joblessness without redeeming
social value.
This suggests an operational definition. Ask the following simple
question of job losers and job leavers: Would you willingly take your
previous job back on the terms now available in the market? If the answer is
yes, the person is involuntarily (or pornographically) unemployed. This seems
a straightforward test whenever there is well-defined previous job, but it
cannot be readily applied to new entrants or reentrants.3 Fortunately, job
6losers and job leavers constitute 60-70% of total measured unemployment in
the U.S. and about 75—80% of the rise in unemployment during recessions.4 So
conceptual difficulties with new entrants and reentrants are of minor
practical importance. We can probably get an excellent Indication of changes
in involuntary unemployment by looking only at job losers.
The definition helps distinguish Involuntary (or socially useless)
unemployment from voluntary (or socially useful) unemployment. People who are
enjoying leisure rather than working at what they perceive as unusually low
wages would not be considered involuntarily unemployed since they presumably
would not take their old jobs back on the previous terms. But few of the
unemployed seem to be doing that, and the facts that real wages are (a) close
to a random walk5 and (b) not very cyclical6 cast serious doubt on the
empirical importance of intertemporal substitution in labor supply.
Similarly, people who are actively pursuing productive job search are not
uselessly unemployed. Certainly, there are such people; but probably not
many. We know, for example, that the average job seeker spends only a few
hours a week on search and rarely rejects a job offer.7
The mention of search brings up the second challenge: explaining high
unemployment theoretically.
SECOND CHALLENGE: EXPLAIN IT THEORETICALLY
In my view, one main reason for our lack of progress in explaining high
unemployment is that academic economists have spent too much time and energy
debating whether involuntary (or pornographic) unemployment exists and too
little theorizing why. Furthermore, too much of our theoretical debate has
taken place within the confining strictures of homogeneous labor, where the
question reduces to whether and why "the wage rate" is sticky. That Is a
7reasonable question; but it is not the only question.
Once we force ourselves to think seriously about the heterogeneity of
labor, the very concept of wage rigidity loses precision. For example, is it
the average level of wages or the structure of relative wages that is sticky?
Instead of sterile debates about why rational people would leave unexploited
Harberger triangles lying on the table, we start thinking about things like
relative status and coordination failures. These are important issues. I
suspect they may be central to understanding high unemployment. But they
simply cannot arise in a homogeneous labor market.
Let me illustrate by pursuing the tantalizing question raised by search
theory: Why doesn't an unemployed person take the first job she finds while
continuing to look for a better one? As a stylized example, why don't
unemployed steelworkers go to work at McDonald's? And, if they do not, should
we consider their unemployment voluntary?
The traditional search—theoretic answer is straightforward and almost
certainly wrong. It holds that search is so much more efficient off the job
than on the job that the efficiency gains from searching while unemployed
outweigh the lost income. No evidence supports this hypothesis. We know that
people can search better on the job in some labor markets. Even in markets
where search is best done while unemployed, it is hard to believe that a few
hours of search activity per week interfere unduly with holding a job --
unlessgeographical relocation is necessary.
An alternative explanation posits the existence of substantial
transactions costs from taking and leaving an interim job. On this view, the
dislodged steelworker rationally refuses the job at McDonald's because his
in-and—out costs exceed the value of the wages he could earn during a few
weeks spent flipping hamburgers. This explanation is logically coherent and
8even believable for people who anticipate an extremely short spell of
unemployment.8 But most unemployment is accounted for by long spells. For
example, 54% of all unemployment in 1984 was accounted for by those
unemployed for 27 weeks or more.9 And besides, it Is hard to see how the
In-and-out costs of taking a short-term job could possibly amount to much
more than one day's time. That can hardly explain voluntarily forsaking
several weekst wages.
Another possibility is that workers who lose "good" jobs worry about
being stigmatized by taking "bad" jobs. I could make this explanation sound
less like pop sociology and more like modern economics by gussying It up with
words like signalling, asymmetric information, and adverse selection. I could
even say It with algebra --butnot right after dinner. In whatever guise,
the Idea is simply that unemployed steelworkers do not want potential
employers thinking of them as hamburger flippers. To those willing to venture
beyond the confines of neoclassical economics, this is an appealing notion.
But there Is one big problem. An unemployed steelworker can lose the stigma
and keep the income by taking the McDonald's job, omitting It from his
resume, and telling prospective employers that he is unemployed.
So let me suggest an alternative hypothesis based on a very old idea,
one which all social scientists but economists find compelling and for which
Robert Frank (1985), in particular, has argued eloquently: that people care
deeply about their relative status in society. To be more precise, suppose
utility depends not just on the level of income but also on one's position in
the Income distribution. Suppose further, and this Is the critical leap, that
you retain the relative status attached to your old jobuntil you take a new
one. Thus an unemployed steelworker remains a steelworker --bothIn his mind
and In the minds of others --untilhe takes a new job; then his status
9changes. If concern about status is high enough and the gap between the
available wage and unemployment compensation Is low enough, the individual
may prefer unemployment as a steelworker to employment on an inferior job.
Direct empirical evidence on this hypothesis is difficult to come by,
though Frank (1985) has offered evidence for the importance of relative
status in a wide variety of contexts, some of them even biological.10 So,
once again, a thought experiment may help. Suppose a plant closing costs a
steelworker his job. After two weeks of puttering around the house, he walks
past the local McDonald's and sees a Help Wanted sign. Does he walk In and
take the job? I think not. Now not? Is it because It would interfere with
his job search? Not likely. Is it because he doesn't want personnel directors
at other steel mills to think of him as a fast—food worker? Perhaps. But how
would they know? I suggest that it may really be because he doesn't want his
friends and neighbors -—and,especially, doesn't want himself ——tosee him
in that low—status position.11
Though based on concern for social status rather on coordination
failures, this idea is reminiscent of an old Keynesian saw: that workers
resist wage reductions because they are concerned that other wages will not
follow suit. To hone and quantify our intuition, consider the following
simple example that applies to either case.
Utility for individual I depends on his own real income and on the ratio
of his ownwageto some comparison wage, wi/wj. Using Cobb-Douglas utility
for convenience, utility while employed is:
U =[)wU0.
Now suppose the worker loses his job and must choose between accepting a job
10paying Awj (A <1)or remaining unemployed and receiving income bwj (b <A)










Thus he will prefer unemployment to the low-paying job if and only if:
(3) b1>x
When there is no concern for relative status, (ct =0),only income
matters and the bad job is preferred to unemployment as long as b <A.But
asgets bigger, the lefthand side of (3) gets larger and the possibility
that the worker might refuse the job grows. A convenient way to look at this
is to ask how large b (the replacement rate) must be to induce the worker to
turn down a job that offers a wage of Xwj. Table 1 tabulates the answer for
various combinations of A and .Forexample, if=0.2,the worker will
turn down a job paying half his previous wage if his replacement rate is
above 42%. The gap between 50% and 42% may not be exciting. But if a is as
large as 1/2, the critical replacement rate drops to 25% ——meaningthat the
worker prefers unemployment and a 75% drop in income to a job paying half his
previous wage.
Precisely the same comparison arises in the Keynesian case of
uncoordinated wage cutting. If workers assume that those earning wj will not
take a wage cut, they expect to receive (1) if they accept a 100(1-A)% wage
cut and (2) if they refuse and lose their jobs. Condition (3) is thus the
condition for preferring a layoff to a wage cut when you do not expect other
11wages to fall. It turns out also to be the condition for refusing the wage
cut when you do expect other wages to fall, for if you take a cut and retain
your job, you get X1U0 while If you refuse and lose your job, you get
[.J]a (bw1)' =b1XU0 .Thelatter exceeds the former if and only if
j
(3) holds.
Perusing Table 1 makes it clear that the value of a is of great moment.
If aissmall, concern for social status cannot take us very far in
explaining unemployment. If aislarge, it becomes a powerful explanator. To
"estimat&' a, I again ask you to introspect. Imagine that in one case your
university raises only your salary by 10% while in another it gives k% to
everyone. How large must k be for these two events to give you the same
satisfaction? Table 2 shows some answers for several values of aandraises
of different sizes. For example, if a =0.2,a 10% raise given just to you is
as good as a 12.7% raise across the board. Each of you can make your own
judgment, but this strikes me as less concern with relative status than most
real people have. Similarly, the a =0.8column strikes me as much more.
Personal introspection tells me that aisbetween 0.2 and 0.5. For example,
if a= 1/3,a 10% raise for me only makes me just as happy as a 15.4% raise
for everyone in my university. That strikes me as roughly correct.
This much concern with relative status is enough to matter. For example,
the entry that would appear in Table 1 for a= 1/3and A =0.5Is 0.35,
meaning that I would rather accept unemployment and a 65% drop In income than
take a job at half my present wage.
Now what I have just presented is an idea, not a model. It has been said
that an economist Is someone who sees that something works in practice and
wonders if it also works in theory. I will not be so obtuse as to try to
12Table 1
Replacement Rate Needed to Turn Down Job
.90 .90 .88 .81 .59
.80 .80 .76 .64 .33
.70 .70 .64 .49 .17
.50 .50 .42 .25 .03
























20% 149%build a theoretical model incorporating this idea at this late hour. But the
dim outlines of such a model are already implicit in an important recent
paper by Laurence Ball and David Romer (1987b). Working with prices of goods
rather than wages of labor, they show that a large real rigidity coupled with
a small fixed cost of changing nominal prices can explain large
non—neutralities of money. By analogy, I conjecture that it is possible to
show that monetary shocks have large effects on employment when workers care
about relative wages and firms have small fixed costs of changing nominal
wages.
This is just one example of the possibilities that arise once we leave
the mythical world of homogeneous labor-—as I think we should. Happily, the
latest developments in the never-ending quest for microfoundations of
macroeconomics make heterogeneity an essential part of the story. I refer, in
particular, to theories of unemployment based on imperfect information,
efficiency wages, insider-outsider distinctions, and monopolistic
competition. And I would like to see concern with relative wages and
"fairness" Included on this list, maybe at the top.
Models of labor markets with imperfect information stress such things as
unobservable differences in productivity and inability of management to
monitor the performance of individual workers. The central message of this
burgeoning literature is that wages may not be able to clear markets because
they are too busy doing other things. Insider—outsider models recognize the
inherent asymmetry in the positions of incumbent workers and challengers.
Heterogeneity of goods is, of course, the essence of monopolistic competition
models. And efficiency-wage models provide many reasons why firms might
deliberately set wages above market—clearing levels -—forexample, to reduce
turnover or to encourage greater work effort.
15Each of these approaches contributes something to giving theoretical
coherence to the Keynesian Intuition that unemployment is often too high.
However, I do not wish to oversell the results, for the welfare economics is
a bit dicey. In imperfect—information and efficiency-wage models, "too high"
generally means higher than in some unattainable perfect-information
equilibrium. In monopolistic competition models, output is lower than it
would be under perfect competition. In these cases, policy interventions are
not always called for and, If they are, make not take the form of macro
stabilization policy.'2 Still, I find all this a refreshing departure from
the scholastic dogma of High Neoclassicism.
However, these new models have so far contributed little to explaining
the changes in unemployment that we observe in time series and that we call
business cycles. Indeed, some seem Ill-suited to the task. Hysteresis models
may be the most promising in this regard, especially in the European context,
for they show how changes in demand can essentially drag supply along —-ina
neat reversal of Say's Law.
Finally, these models shed little light on why nominal shocks have
strong real effects, for each is fundamentally a story about relative prices
or real wages. As I just indicated, one way to transform a real rigidity into
a nominal rigidity is to add costs of changing nominal prices or wages.
Akerlof and Yellen (1985) add fixed costs of changing prices to a model with
efficiency wages.13 Blanchard and Kiyotakl (1987), building on the insights
of Mankiw (1985), do the same in a monopolistic competition model. I believe
combining costs of changing money wages with a strong concern about relative
wages and/or "fairness" is a promising approach to explaininghow
fluctuations in demand produce fluctuations in employment.
This theoretical work Is still in its infancy (some of it is still in
16utero) and is not without difficulties. While costs of changing prices
certainly exist, it is hard to believe that they are large. That is why Ball
and Romer's (1987b) demonstration that large monetary non-neutralities can
result from the interaction of small nominal rigidities and large real
rigidities is so important. However, costs of changing quantities also
undoubtedly exist; so it is not clear that adjustment costs logically lead to
rigid prices and flexible quantities. Finally, theories based on fixed costs
of changing prices ("menu costs") need to be recast in a dynamic framework
which recognizes that optimal strategies are likely to be variants of the
(S,s) rule of inventory theory in which firms adjust prices at different
tinies.14
The Keynesian promised land is not yet in sight; but we may, at long
last, be emerging from the arid desert and looking over the Jordan. Let me
use the license granted me on this occasion to peer beyond where we can
really see and speculate briefly on the outlines of a model that is both
theoretically respectable and can be explained in mixed company without
embarrassment. The model I envision —-butdo not have --hasthree main
ingredients.
The first is efficiency wages, so there is no tendency for labor markets
to clear in the naive neoclassical sense. Large firms, most of which have
market power and some fat in their cost structures, pay wages high enough to
maintain a queue of qualified job seekers and to retain the workers they
have. They do so because turnover is disruptive, because higher wages attract
superior applicants, and, perhaps most importantly, because workers perform
better when they feel they are well paid.15 The result is excess supply and
unemployment in equilibrium. I propose to call this unemployment involuntary,
though nothing of substance rides on the name.
17The second ingredient is the hypothesis that workers care deeply about
relative wages. This accomplishes two things. It rationalizes firms'
decisions to pay efficiency-wage premla. And it explains why a worker laid
off from a "good job" may prefer unemployment to a "bad job," at least for a
while. The latter makes it possible for secondary labor markets to clear, or
even to have excess demand, while involuntary (or socially useless)
unemployment exists in primary labor markets.
Third, small costs of changing nominal wages and prices, coordination
failures ("I'll cut my wage if you'll cut yours"), and notions of fairness16
combine to prevent full adjustments to moderate shocks, whether nominal or
real.
Consider what might happen in such a model if aggregate demand declines.
Sales fall In many sectors of the economy, but unevenly. Although prices
might drop in sectors experiencing extreme declines In demand, fixed costs
keep most prices fixed. Virtually no wages fall due to firms' fully rational
fears that wage cuts would lead to lower productivity, perhaps because wage
cutting is widely perceived to be unfair.'7 Instead, most firms reduce output
arid employment.
The cyclically—sensitive durable goods industries will be hit hardest by
a typical downturn. It seems to be an interesting fact, which I will not
attempt to explain, that they also pay very high wages.18 Many of the
workers laid off by those high-wage, cyclical industries will refuse
low—status jobs in less cyclical Industries, preferring to be unemployed
steelworkers than employed hamburger flippers. Falling incomes lead to
still-lower demand for goods, in a Keynesian multiplier process. Social
welfare, I submit, falls.
18THIRD CHALLENGE: EXPLAIN IT EMPIRICALLY
Economics is not an art form. So we must not be content with a coherent
and vaguely sensible theory of unemployment --welcomeas that would be. We
must give the theory empirical content, test it, and estimate its central
parameters.
In a sense, macroeconomics has progressed further on the empirical front
than on the theoretical front. The truth of the matter is that empirical
Keynesian models equipped with Phillips curves that allow for supply shocks
have done rather well lately. Furthermore, the Phillips curve has been one of
the strongest links in the empirical chain. Despite frequent reports of their
demise, Bob Gordon's equations are alive and well and living near Chicago.19
Academic economists jettisoned the Phillips curve not because of empirical
failures but because of a priori theoretical objections.2° If we keep
behaving like that, we may never become as useful as dentists.
What macroeconomics needs next is to give the new generation of
Keynesian microfoundations some empirical teeth. You can think of this as
providing theoretical justification for the Phillips curve, if you wish. I
prefer to think of it as providing empirical justification for all the
theorizing.
FOURTH CHALLENGE: DEVISE POLICIES TO REDUCE IT
Logically, of course, this is the last step. But Keynes did not work
that way, and the world will not wait while we perfect our models.
Observation of real economies suggests that the qualitative effects of
demand management policies are more or less as taught in the elementary
textbooks, or at least in most of them. Among other things, that means there
will be an inflationary price to pay if unemployment is reduced by
19stimulating aggregate demand. It is the drive to subdue inflation, not any
lack of knowledge about how to manipulate aggregate demand, that has
accounted for high unemployment these past dozen years.
The nature of the policy challenge depends sensitively on whether or not
the natural rate hypothesis is valid. If it is, then we can do no more than
seek to flatten the Phillips curve or reduce the natural rate by labor—market
policies. That remark is a place to begin a lecture, not to end one, so I
will not pursue it further.
More enticing possibilities emerge if the natural rate is not so
natural. Suppose, for example, that the equilibrium level of unemployment is
strongly affected by hysteresis. Then a boost to demand might give the
economy much more than a temporary high; it might actually lower unemployment
permanently. My Keynesian instincts tell me that the low—unemployment
equilibrium must be better than the high—unemployment one.
U.S. data for the 1980s look pretty consistent with the natural rate
hypothesis to me -—witha natural rate in the 5.5%—6% range. But there is
room for doubt. However, both the evidence of the senses and econometrics
shun the natural rate hypothesis for Europe,21 where none of the
microeconomic factors comes close to explaining a quadrupling of
unemployment. There a dose of expansionary policy might do the world a world
of good.
III. THE CHALLENGE TO MICROECONOMISTS
Macroeconomics has long been regarded as the poor cousin of
microeconomics, and with some justification. Surely it is mainly
macroeconomists who have sullied the family name. But that is not because
20microeconomists have dealt with unemployment better; far from it. For the
most part, microeconomic analysis ignores unemployment, as if it were an
institutional detail of no great import.
Working within a full-employment framework would be justifiable on
division—of-labor grounds if the premise of the neoclassical synthesis had
been fulfilled. But plainly it has not been. Governments have failed to
maintain anything like full employment and therefore have not created the
conditions under which standard microtheory applies. Alternatively, the
microeconomist's fixation on full-employment models might be legitimate If
allocative decisions neither affected nor were affected by the overall level
of employment. This might be true in some applications,22 but there is no
reason to think It holds generally. Let me illustrate with two examples.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY
My first example is trade theory. Virtually all economists support free
trade; but a frustratingly large number of noneconomists do not. Members of
our fraternity are constantly amazed at the depth and strength of
protectionist sentiment, which we view as evidence of either rent-seeking
behavior or low Intelligence. Doubtless, some protectionists qualify under
both rubrics. But I want to suggest there is more to the matter.
One reason for economists' near-unanimous support of free trade is our
use of the long—run, full-employment framework for policy evaluation. In our
world, workers displaced by foreign competition move into industries in which
our country has a comparative advantage. That can only raise productivity; so
both GNP and social welfare should rise. How, except as viewed through the
distorting lenses of a special pleader, could that be bad?
But people unencumbered by advanced degrees In economics see trade
21policy differently. They live in real space and time, where unemployment
truly exists and workers displaced by foreign competition often move into
unemployment rather than into new jobs. So they reason that our GNP will fall
if our markets are opened to free trade. How, except in the strange world of
the economic theorist, could that be good?
The two world-views generate rather different predictions. Which is
right?
Consider a concrete example. Korean firms learn how to make television
sets efficiently and want to export them to the United States. The TV
industry and its workers petition Congress for a strict quota to "save jobs."
Economists scoff at the Idea. According to standard trade theory, America can
only gain by opening its borders to Korean TV5. A quota cannot save jobs; it
can only trap labor in an Industry in which the United States has no
comparative advantage.
Though oversimplified and missing many of the qualifications a good
trade theorist would want, this conclusion probably characterizes the typical
economist's view of the matter. And it is also probably the right view for
the long run. It might even be right for the short run, if the unemployment
rate were 4%. But suppose Korea learns how to make TVs when the U.S.
unemployment rate is 10%. Who can honestly assure a displaced factory worker
that she will quickly find a new job at a wage close to her present one, as
she would in the world envisioned by Ricardian comparative advantage? Isn't
it more likely that she will suffer a spell of joblessness, perhaps a lengthy
one? Aren't these short-run costs relevant to any social decision?
I anticipate your response and I agree with it: The appropriate solution
is not to erect trade barriers but to pursue a vigorous full—employment
policy so that displaced workers will be quickly reemployed. That is
22precisely my point. Conditions of full employment are necessary to validate
standard propositions in trade theory. High unemployment calls many of these
propositions into question. Both the positive predictions of trade theory and
its normative prescriptions may be wrong. For example, Brecher (1974) showed
years ago that, when unemployment results from a rigid real wage, free trade
may reduce both employment and welfare. Furthermore, if unemployment were
eradicated by abolishing the wage floor, patterns of trade might reverse.
Those who are wary of free trade may have a valid point in the presence of
unemployment, as even Adam Smith realized.23 At the very least, trade
adjustment assistance should perhaps become a more integral part of the
advocacy of free trade.24
Now, I am not trying to argue for protectionism. Though we may all be
dead in the long run, someone will be alive. And a nation that protects one
senile industry after another winds up looking like a nursing home for state
capitalism. Economists correctly seek to avoid this outcome. Besides, the
mere existence of unemployment does not by Itself imply that protection is
better than free trade.
I an arguing, however, that trade theorists could do their job —-the
job Marshall wanted them to do --betterif they paid more attention to the
short run. At a minimum, it would narrow the communication gap between
economists and the public. We insist on speaking in a long-run equilibrium
dialect to people who live in a short-run disequilibrium world. No wonder
what we say sounds Greek to them. We could, I believe, spend more time in
their world without abandoning our own. And, If we did, everyone would
benefit. Isn't that an unexploited Harberger triangle?
The phenomenon of unemployment, of course, is not unknown to trade
theorists; and some interesting work has been done. But ask yourself what
23fraction of the enormous trade—theory literature deals with unemployment.
10%? 5%? Can that be an optimal allocation of resources?
PUBLIC FINANCE
My second and last case In point, public finance, is a far greater
offender. Once we get past the sizable literature on unemployment insurance,
hardly any work In public finance even recognizes the existence of
unemployment. Looking at this allocation of scholarly resources tempts me to
prescribe a Pigouvian tax on full—employment theorizing.
Here is what we typically tell our youth about the Incidence. An excise
tax Is imposed on commodity A. In consequence, the price of A rises and the
quantity falls. Resources released from the A industry migrate into the B, C,
o... industries,where prices therefore fall and quantities rise. In the
end, labor and capital are reallocated, relative prices adjust to the tax
distortion, and another deadweight loss is born --aboutwhich we teach our
students to worry deeply. Chances are that neither the price level nor
aggregate employment ever arises.
Ordinary people may be forgiven for wondering if something important has
not been left out of the story. Will displaced workers really be quickly
reemployed in other Industries? Aren't they more likely to experience a
transitional period of joblessness, perhaps a long one? And won't the excise
tax raise the price level? Old-fashioned macroeconometric models, you'll
note, share this common-sense view. Plug an excise—tax hike into theDRI or
Wharton model and you'll get back increases in both prices and unemployment.
(You won't get the Harberger triangle, which is a shortcoming ofthese
models.) Maybe, just maybe, the macro models are right and the micro
theorists wrong.
24I am not looking to score debater's points here. My claim is thatmany
of the most cherished results of incidence theory change fundamentally once
we allow for unemployment.
Consider, for example, the simple idea that an Increase in an excise tax
raises the price of the commodity to consumers. In one of the few papers on
public finance theory in the presence of unemployment, Dixit (1976) showed
that falling employment might so depress demand that the price of the taxed
commodity actually falls.
Or consider what may be the most basic theorem of public finance: the
irrelevance of the side of the market on which a tax is levied. We all have
had fun explaining to our beginning students why it doesn't matter whether
the payroll tax is levied on employers or employees. Then why, perhaps we
should wonder, do Congress, labor, and management all think the decision so
momentous? Sheer lack of understanding? Maybe. But maybe not.
I submit that part of the answer is, once again, that we economists
insist on thinking long-run equilibrium while everyone else lives In
short—run disequilibrium. The truth of the matter is that the incidence of
the payroll tax may differ dramatically in the short and long runs; and, as
Hamermesh (1980) showed with an empirically-based simulation model, the short
run may not be so short.
To see why, let us trace through what would happen if Congress abolished
the employee's share and raised the employer's share by an equal amount --a
non-event in the eyes of conventional theory. Initially, contractual wages
are fixed, so both labor costs and take-home pay would rise. That, as we
know, would create excess supply in labor markets, wages would fall, and so
on. You can all complete the story leading to the conclusion that, in the
end, nothing will have changed.
25True enough. But the end is not the beginning. By blithely skipping
over the adjustment period, we miss something important. Immediately after
the law changes, firms are paying more and workers are receiving more; so
capital bears the entire burden of the tax change ——justas our mythical
Congress intended. Had Congress shifted burdens in the opposite direction,
labor would have lost out in the short run. So Congress's decision really
does matter, at least for a while. No wonder workers and capitalists fret
over where the tax is levied and are mystified by economists' indifference.
We call them myopic. They call us out of touch. Both, I am afraid, are right.
Essentially this same point underlies an interesting recent paper by
Poterba, Rotemberg and Summers (1986) which shows that a balanced-budget
shift from direct to indirect taxation will reduce employment in a Keynesian
model with nominal rigidities, but not in a classical full—employment model.
In a similar vein, van de Klundert and Peters (1986) coax a number of
fascinating results out of a disequilibrium simulation model reminiscent of
Dixit's theoretical paper. They find, for example, that a sales tax given
back in a lump sum reduces employment dramatically more in the Keynesian
first period than in the classical steady state.
Thus the differences between the long—run equilibrium results that we
know and love (and teach to our young) and the short-run disequilibrium
results that people actually experience are no mere quibbles. They may be
fundamental. And that may be one reason why our advice so often falls on
deaf ears.
Once again, the solution is not to abandon long-run analysis. The
long-run questions are important and meaningful, and here economists are
often right and the public wrong. Rather, the solution is to allow some
consideration of short-run employment effects to creep into and temper our
26analysis.
IV. VISIONS OF SUGAR PLUMS...
Lest I have failed to say anything provocative so far, let me conclude
by trying once again, on this third night after Christmas, to get visions of
New Jersey --or,if that is impossible, Massachusetts -—dancingin your
heads.
America now has a remarkable swath of prosperity in its northeast
quadrant. It starts around Boston, runs through most of New England and down
to the New York metropolitan area, then continues through central New Jersey
and Philadelphia and on into Delaware, Maryland, and Washington, D.C.,
finally ending in portions of Virginia and North Carolina. By world
standards, this is a very large economy; and, within it, unemployment rates
of 4% and below are common.
Three questions cry out for answers. First, what created the boom?
Second, how have these prosperous states managed to sustain such tight labor
markets without blowing the lid off inflation? Third, could the entire United
States accomplish something similar?
Both New Jersey and Massachusetts moved from the basket cases to
showcases in a scant eight years.25 New Jersey's unemployment rate went from
2.7 percentage points above the national rate in 1976 to 2.3 points below in
1984. Massachusetts' unemployment rate went from 2.6 points above the
national rate to 2.7 points below between 1975 and 1983. How?
The answers are not well known and are probably not simple. Obviously,
it was not Keynesian demand management by the state governments. However,
rapid aggregate demand growth did play an important role in Massachusetts,
which benefited from strong defense spending and "exports" of high-technology
27manufactures to the rest of the United States. But New Jersey's economic
renaissance came while its manufacturing sector was dwindling from 33% of
private sector employment to only 23%. Services, especially information
services, and construction led the way.
At the national level, we understand how to stimulate demand. So the
more interesting question is how New Jersey and Massachusetts have kept
inflation in check despite stunningly low unemployment rates.26
Two hypotheses can be ruled out immediately. The first is that stingy
unemployment insurance and other tight-fisted government policies lowered the
natural rates of unemployment. None of this is remotely close to the truth in
either state.27 The second hypothesis Is that immigration or, alternatively,
the use of guest workers provided these states with large Influxes of labor
at more or less fixed wages. No such thing happened. In fact, population
growth in Massachusetts and New Jersey has been slower, and wage growth
faster, than in the rest of the country. And I can assure you that New Jersey
sends more guest workers --wecall them commuters --toNew York than New
York sends to New Jersey.
The reasons must lie elsewhere. Let me offer two speculative
possibilities. The first is hysteresis. Whether because outsiders became
Insiders, because high employment led to high capital formation, or because
rapid growth stimulated innovation, the equilibrium unemployment rates In
these two states may now be far lower than they were in 1975. If that Is the
explanation, we are left wondering whether the entire United States might do
something similar.
The second has to do with openness. Each state of the union Is a small
open economy with fixed exchange rates and no trade barriers vis-a—vis the
others. In can therefore acquire the goods its citizens demand at more or
28less fixed prices in the huge national market. That is why textiles, shoes,
refrigerators, and automobiles cost no more in New Jersey and Massachusetts
than in the other 48. Nontraded goods, of course, are a different matter.
Housing prices in the Boston and Princeton areas (indeed, in all the suburbs
of New York), for example, are legendary. Were these states closed to trade
with the rest of the country, their inflation rates would undoubtedly be much
higher.
But what about the nation as a whole? America is certainly not a small
economy. Nor is it as open to trade with the rest of the world as Individual
states are with the rest of the nation. Nor is the exchange rate fixed. So,
if the national labor market tightened dramatically, we could not count on an
infinitely elastic supply of imports to keep inflation as subdued as in New
Jersey and Massachusetts. However, we could count on the world market to
provide some moderation of Inflationary pressures in tradable goods -—at
least as long as the rest of the world was not also in an exuberant boom. So
perhaps the nation, with a balanced monetary and fiscal expansion and
thorough-going free trade in goods (but not in labor), could emulate the
Massachusetts and New Jersey success stories to some degree.
This is an important respect, I believe, In which free trade helps
support a policy of low unemployment. And I argued earlier that low
unemployment helps support free trade. That raises the tantalizing
possibility of a virtuous circle in which high levels of aggregate demand
create tight labor markets while open international trade moderates
Inflationary pressures. Now, that would truly be a grand neoclassical
synthesis. But, to get there, policymakers, macroeconomists, and
microeconomists all must rise to meet the challenge of high unemployment.
To do so effectively, we must leave the rubble of academic Star Wars
29behind us. We must stop arguing over easy questions with known answers (like
whether socially useless unemployment exists), and start worrying about
difficult questions with unknown answers (like which of the theoretical
explanations for unemployment are empirically important). Macroeconomics
these last 15 years has accomplished far too little that would make Alfred
Marshall proud. It is time we gave that grand old man his due.
30'Among the many possible references that could be cited, see the special
1986 supplement of Economica or Gennard (1985).
2A. Marshall, "The Present Position of Economics," in Pigou (1925,p.
174), original in 1885. I thank Avinash Dixit for finding this quotation.
3Clark and Summers (1979) have argued persuasively that many reentrants
are really job losers. The definition also applies to such people.
4Data on unemployment by reason are available only for the last four
recessions. In those recessions, job losers and leavers accounted for 70%,
73%, 93%, and 80% of the peak—to-trough rise in the unemployment rate (using
NBER cycle dates). The vast majority of this was from job losers. A
regression of the job loser rate on time, a constant, and the overall
unemployment rate (monthly data, January 1967 to February 1987) produces a
coefficient of 0.75 on the latter.
5Altonji and Ashenfelter (1980).
6Geary and Kennan (1982), Bus (1985).
7Clark and Summers (1979, pp. 54-55). Only 10 percent of unemployed
people in the specIal 1976 job-search survey reported rejecting a job offer.
81n such cases, intertemporal substitution is also an attractive
explanation.
9See Summers (1986), Table 5, page 353.
10lnterviews conducted by Jean Baldwin Grossman (1980) found that most
firms adjusted above—minimum wages promptly after the statutory increase in
the minimum wage in January 1979.
11As evidence for this, labor economists have found that high previous
wages lead to high reservation wages. See, for example, Kiefer and Neumann
31(1979).
12Ball and Romer (1987a).
13Akerlof and Yellen actually assume what they call "near rationality."
This is equivalent to rationality in the presence of fixed costs.
14Caplln and Spulber (1987) Illustrate the idea; but their analysis
pertains only to steady states with constant s and S. In reality, s and S
will undoubtedly be time varying. See, for example, the analysis in Blinder
(1981) or Bar-Ilan and Blinder (1988).
15Akerlof (1982), Akerlof and Yellen (1987).
16Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986).
17 Kahneman et al. (1986), also Kaufman (1984).
181n part, the high wages are compensation for the volatile emplopment.
But I doubt that this is the whole story, for if low-wage, stable jobs were
just as desirable as high-wage, variable ones, why would there always be
queues of prospective workers at the high—wage firms?
19Gordon (1988).
20Blinder (1986), Blanchard (1987).
21Blanchard and Summers (1986).
22For example, some micro policies are too small to have meaningful
macro effects (e.g, airline deregulation). Another possibility is that
central bank policy fixes real GNP.
23Mylnt (1958).
24Riordan and Staiger (1987) show that trade adjustment assistance is
welfare improving if terms of trade shocks are large enough. In their model,
the unemployment results from informational asymmetries.
250n Massachusetts, see Ferguson and Ladd (1986) and Bradbury and Browne
(1987). The New Jersey story has been studied much less. See the 18th
32Annual Report of the State's Economic Policy Council.
26lhere is no CPI for New Jersey. But inflation rates in both the
Philadelphia and New York City areas have been slightly below the national
average. Inflation in the Boston area has run only slightly higher than
national inflation.
27The taxpayers' revolt in Massachusetts is sometimes cited; but the
timing is all wrong. Tax cuts began in 1981, but the "miracle" occurred
between 1975 and 1983.
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